In 1867 the United States acquired Alaska from Russia. According to the United States Department of State:
Russia offered to sell Alaska to the United States in 1859, believing the United States would off-set the designs of Russia’s greatest rival in the Pacific, Great Britain. The looming U.S. Civil War delayed the sale, but after the war, Secretary of State William Seward quickly took up a renewed Russian offer and on March 30, 1867, agreed to a proposal from Russian Minister in Washington, Edouard de Stoeckl, to purchase Alaska for $7.2 million. The Senate approved the treaty of purchase on April 9; President Andrew Johnson signed the treaty on May 28, 1867. Alaska was formally transferred to the United States on October 18, 1867.
The Alaska Purchase is usually counted as a significant achievement of the Johnson Administration.
The Painting Above: “Signing of the Alaska Treaty” by Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze, depicts William H. Seward (seated by the desk) and Russian envoy Eduard de Stoeckl (standing by the globe). The painting, from the collection of the Seward House Museum, Auburn, New York.
When we hear of Seward’s Folly, we need to understand the political context. The treaty for the purchase of Alaska was taking place in 1867. Seward, once an Abolitionist hero was now seen as a compromised ally of the widely hated President Andrew Johnson. Seward, who have favored voting rights for blacks in New York, supported Johnson’s opposition to black suffrage in the District of Columbia. He was seen as having been corrupted by his desire to retain power by going along with Johnson’s racist policies.
Seward had long been interested in acquiring Alaska. His biographer Walter Stahr writes:
Seward’s initial interest in Russian America—the region we now know as Alaska—stemmed from his interest in whaling, which he viewed as both an important industry and an element of national naval power. In 1852, in the course of a Senate speech on whaling, Seward had recommended that the Navy survey the waters around the Bering Strait, already a favorite ground for American whalers. Seward was probably aware of the discussions in the late 1850s between his friend Senator William Gwin and the Russian minister Stoeckl about the possible American purchase of the Russian colony. Such awareness could help explain Seward’s bold statement in his 1860 campaign speech that the towns and forts of Russian America would “yet become the outposts of my own country.” In late 1864, when Seward learned that Russia might be prepared to sell the territory, he invited the czar’s brother, Grand Duke Konstantin, the leading proponent of the sale, to come to the United States. Face-to-face talks, Seward wrote the American minister in Russia, “would be beneficial to us, and by no means unprofitable to Russia. I forbear from specifying my reasons. They will readily occur to you.” Konstantin did not come to America, but Seward did not forget the issue. [Stahr, Walter. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man (Kindle Locations 8884-8893)]
We also need to understand the Russian Point of view in the sale. They were not just acting to get seven million dollars. The U.S. was becoming notorious for violently taking land from natives and Mexicans, and for sending paramilitary groups to try to capture land across the Caribbean. Stahr writes of the Russian minister (ambassador) to the U.S.:
Stoeckl’s postwar reports to the Russian foreign minister show that he was worried that American settlers would soon take over Russian America, more or less as they had taken over the Mexican territories of California and Texas earlier in the century. Indeed, by the time Stoeckl departed Washington in late 1866 for a few months of home leave in St. Petersburg, he was convinced that Russia should sell Russian America to the United States. Seward almost certainly encouraged Stoeckl in these views. [Stahr, Walter. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man (Kindle Locations 8897-8900).]
The Russian minister came back to the U.S. in February of 1867. Stahl writes:
As Stoeckl later reported to the Russian foreign minister, “I put myself in contact with the Secretary of State by the intermediary of one of his political friends who exercises great influence over him,” and hinted that he was now ready to talk. This unnamed friend was probably Thurlow Weed, now living in New York City and editing the Commercial Advertiser. Weed’s newspaper would soon emerge as one of the main advocates of the proposed Russian treaty. When Stoeckl at last returned to his post in Washington, he met with Seward, probably on March 11. After preliminary pleasantries, Stoeckl alluded to the Washington fishing petition and to other American efforts to obtain rights in the Russian territory, and said that Russia would never grant such rights. As Stoeckl hoped, Seward then raised the question of whether Russia would be prepared to sell the territory. As Seward hoped, Stoeckl responded that the Russian government had now authorized him to negotiate the terms of a sale. Seward said that before they started negotiations, he would need to speak with Johnson.
At a second meeting a few days later, Seward told Stoeckl that although the president was “not inclined to the transaction,” he would allow the secretary to negotiate terms. Seward would still need to confer with the cabinet, and Stoeckl offered to confer in parallel with key senators and representatives. Seward instantly objected; as Stoeckl reported the conversation, he insisted that “this negotiation must be conducted in the greatest secrecy. Let us first see if we can agree. It will be time then to consult with Congress.” Seward was surely right to prevent Stoeckl from talking with senators, for such discussions would have led to press reports, which would have led to criticism even before Seward and Stoeckl agreed on terms. As to price, Seward first mentioned $5 million, but before Stoeckl even reacted, he added that “we might even go to $5,500,000, but no more.” Stoeckl may have countered with $7 million; he at least indicated that he was not prepared to accept Seward’s price.
[Stahr, Walter. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man (Kindle Locations 8902-8918).]
Although Russia and the U.S. had not yet agreed to the purchase price, Seward drafter a treaty for 7 million dollars.
Seward sought cabinet approval for a seven million dollar price for the purchase. He then met with the Russian minister to discuss the proposed treaty. The Russian was put off when he realized that even with the acceptance of the treaty and its ratification by the Senate, he would still have to wait for Congress to reconvene in December to appropriate the seven million dollars before Russia could be paid.
Seward went back to the cabinet on March 19, 1867 with minor changes in the treaty and the cabinet agreed to it and a 7 million dollar purchase price without opposition. He then went back to the Russian minister and reportedly lied to him and told him that there had been significant opposition to the treaty in the cabinet. He said that the cabinet had objected to the price and that they wanted him to only pay 6.5 million dollars. Seward allowed himself to be persuaded by the Russian minister to raise the price to $7 million if the Russians threw in some buildings that they owned in Alaska!
The Russian minister sent a long telegram to the Foreign Ministry that detailed the terms. He said that Seward had agreed to pay for the telegram, but, again, Seward may have lied, because he later refused to pay. The telegram wound up costing the Russian government $9,000, about $200,000 in today’s money.
The March 26, 1867 telegram from the Russian minister includes this sentance:
“I send this telegram at the request of Seward who pays for it and who said to me that he has met with great opposition in the cabinet because of the sum agreed on and that for the affair to succeed it will be necessary to make haste and have the treaty confirmed by the Senate which is to sit for two weeks longer.” [Stahr, Walter. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man (Kindle Locations 8943-8946).]
On the evening of March 29, the Russian minister came to see Seward to tell him that he had received a telegram authorizing him to sign the treaty. He told Seward that they should meet the next day to do so. Seward gave his famous reply:
“Why wait till tomorrow, Mr. Stoeckl? Let us make the treaty tonight.” “But your department is closed,” Stoeckl responded. “You have no clerks, and my secretaries are scattered about the town.”
“Never mind,” said Seward, with a wave of his hand. “If you can muster your legation together before midnight, you will find me awaiting at the department, which shall be open and ready for business.”
[Stahr, Walter. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man (Kindle Locations 8951-8955).]
The Russian minister, Seward, and Senator Charles Sumner and several aides went to the State Department to finalize the treaty. The Russian minister asked that the Russians continue to have the concession for selling ice to San Francisco for one more year. Seward objected because he wanted the U.S. to own Alaska “free and clear” without reserved rights for Russia. He offered an extra $200,000 to assuage the Russians. This money was not ok-ed in advance with the president or the cabinet.
The $7.2 million price was agreed to and Seward and Stoeckl signed it at 4AM on March 30, 1867.
Seward went to the Senate on the morning of March 30 to prepare it for ratification. President Johnson formally subitted the treaty later that same day. Seward wanted the Senate to ratify before it adjourned, but Sumner, head of the Foreign Relations Committee, said that he wanted the Senate to have a full chance to discuss it before it was voted on. The Senate went into special session to have time to consider it.
The New York Tribune immediately mocked the Alaska Purchase, saying that “there is not, in the history of diplomacy, such insensate folly as this treaty.” Seward’s biographer Stahr says that most of the press supported Seward’s treaty, at least initially. But, while only the Tribune condemned it as a folly from the start, many editors would create a false memory of opposing it from inception when they later came to denounce it in the fall of 1867 and in subsequent years. [Source of quote: Stahr, Walter. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man (Kindle Locations 8989-8990).]
Seward set in motion a press campaign to support the purchase and he was helped when his opponents Thad Stevens and Salmon Chase let it be known that they supported the treaty. Seward held at least four dinner parties right after the treaty was signed to win over Senators. The NY Tribune wrote of these:
“the influence of these Russian treaty dinner parties can be measured from day to day. Senators can be named who were positively against the treaty when it was sent to the Senate, and who now when interrogated half-apologetically confess their purpose to vote for it.” [Quote found in Stahr, Walter. Seward: Lincoln’s Indispensable Man (Kindle Locations 9034-9036).]
Senator Fessenden joked that he would support the treaty only if Seward was condemned to live in Alaska. The Sec. of State was definitely unpopular with many Republicans, even if they appreciated his foreign policy work. On April 9, 1867 Sumner moved that the Senate ratify the treaty, and it did so by a vote of 37 to 2 in favor of ratification. I note that in an earlier procedural vote, 10 Senators had voted to delay a vote on the Treaty, which indicates that a quarter of the senators had at least some reservations about it.
On October 18, 1867 U.S. army troops and naval forces took possession of Alaska. That day is commemorated annually as “Alaska Day” in the 49th State.
That should be the happy ending of the story, at least for the white folks involved. However, Andrew Johnson could not stop himself from antagonizing Congressional Republicans. By the time the House reconvened in December 1867, many Republicans viewed the vote on the appropriation to pay for Alaska as a way to make Johnson miserable. Even though the U.S. had a treaty guaranteeing the payment of 7.2 million dollars and the U.S. had already taken over Alaska, newspapers and Representatives began attacking the deal.
Many had also become concerned that Seward was now trying to negotiate for other territorial acquisitions.
It would take until May 18, 1868 for the House Foreign Affairs Committee to approve the payment to Russia. The full House did not begin debate on the appropriation until the end of June. The bill finally passed on July 14. The appropriation bill had a poison pill in it, but the conference committee resolved that and the president signed the bill on July 27, 1868.
Here is the Library of Congress page on the Alaska Purchase for those who want to learn more.
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